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^ NOT GETTING IT WRONG:
SCIENCE AND DESIGN IN ARCHITECTURE
Design seeks to stop things going as badly as they might
otherwise do. That is not a definition of design. It is the be-
ginning of an attempt to answer the question, «Why do we
design?». What is the purpose or use of designing? Defini-
tions are useful guides to understanding words, not always so
useful in understanding life. JONES (1970, 1981) gives eleven
different definitions of design which he attempts to summa-
rise in a twelfth: «To initiate change in man-made things.»
This definition does suggest some answers to our question:
we are going to do something, necessarily in the future, per-
haps some time off, and there is something new about it.
There is another element common to several of the definitions
Jones gives: the element of attempted foresight or planning.
Instead of simply doing something, we are going to do it in
anticipation, so to speak; we are going to simulate our pro-
posed action before we actually do it. Now we would surely
not go to all this trouble if we believed that success was inevi-
table. We do it because we fear that things will go wrong. Our
intended action is likely to fail, and it is to avert that failure
that we plan or design. Design seeks to stop things going badly.
Things go badly, by and large, because of human limita-
tions. Mackie quotes G. J. Warnock to the effect that the hu-
man predicament is «inherently such that things are liable to
go very badly». Mackie goes on to say:
Among the factors which contribute to make things go
badly in the natural course of events are various limitations
—limited resources, limited information, limited intelli-
gence, limited rationality, but above all, limited sympathies
(MACKIE, 1977: 108).
That is a statement which should be carved in stone in
some prominent place in every design school. Leaving that
aside, however, we notice that most of these limitations are
human limitations. If we knew more, if we acted more wisely
and generously, or even more cautiously, resources would not
be a problem. These human limitations are all too familiar,
but there is amongst designers a strong tradition of
Utopianism which tends to make us ignore them. If the ap-
proach to design taken here seems a negative one, it is in part
as a counter to that Utopian tradition which seems so positive
and yet does so much harm.
Design therefore aims at removing human limitations.
That is, our first proposition, that design seeks to prevent
things going badly, turns out to imply that design seeks to re-
move the limitations of resources, of information, of intelli-
gence, of rationality and of sympathy that operate in the nor-
mal course of events. Does that seem too sweeping a
statement? No practising designer is likely to deny that de-
sign is concerned with removing limitations of resources.
Readers of a journal such as this will not dispute that it is, or
should be, concerned with removing limitations of informa-
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tion. It is widely accepted that designers should be concerned
for the needs and aspirations of the users of their buildings,
which involves sympathy as well as knowledge. Design
clearly aims at overcoming these limitations. Yet important
as they are, these human limitations are not central to design.
They do not create the need for design. They do not deter-
mine its character as an activity. The need for design arises
because of the limitations of our intelligence and rationality,
which are narrow and absolute. What are these limitations?
Let us consider them in the context of the limitations on de-
sign itself.
Design is subject to human limitations. Design resources
are limited, particularly the fundamental resource of time.
The designer cannot, and does not, get all the information
which is necessary, or desirable. Designers are often and
justly criticised for their failures of sympathy; it is the leit-
motif of the environment —behaviour literature. Yet their
most decisive limitation is the human limitation of rationality
and intelligence. While rationality and intelligence are sub-
ject to a variety of limitations, the most important is the limi-
tation of the processing capacity of our short-term memory.
The «short-term memory» is jargon for what we ordinarily
call our consciousness. The limitation of our short-term
memory determines the number of things of which we can be
conscious, that is, the number of things we can think about
simultaneously. This number was identified by George R.
Miller in a very famous paper «The magical number 7 Plus or
Minus 2» (MILLER, 1956, 1967). We cannot think of more than
nine things at once; in practice, most of us cannot think of
it/> more than three or four. Many kinds of games and many eve-
" ryday experiences depend on this fact, which is easily dem-
onstrated by simple parlour experiments. Yet it seldom ob-
trudes into awareness, and its vital consequences are not
widely understood or accepted.
Inadequate understanding of our limitations underlies a
number of false theories of design. Holistic theories, theories
of inspiration, theories of design as art, theories of genius, and
the more recently fashionable phenomenological theories are
all false. All these theories, which we may generally label
«Romantic» have in common the notion that the designer
sometimes conceives a solution whole, complete, all in one
piece. If human beings could do this, design would be unnec-
essary. Design exists because our capacity to envisage the fu-
ture, to cope with complexity, to cope with novelty, is so
narrowly limited. Instead of saying «We will do this», the
Utopian vision complete in our minds, we have to work it out.
For the Utopian vision can consist of no more than nine, and
probably no more than six, things. The complexity of the real
world, its contradictions and conflicts, its ignorances, have
been drastically edited. And what has been omitted, even in a
little, familiar thing like a house, may be important. When the
time comes to carry out the design serious conflicts which
have not been considered will emerge. They have been edited
out, but they will not stay out. Things will go badly wrong.
These false theories, in turn, prevent the effective use of
science in designing. Indeed, it must be admitted that one rea-
son for their popularity is that they provide an excuse for not
learning some difficult subjects, and for not doing work
which many designers are reluctant to do. Laziness should
perhaps be included in our list of human limitations. How-
ever, such theories are also seriously and passionately held by
many designers. Where this is so, the effective application of
science is excluded. It is excluded in principle, because eve-
rything of significance is assumed to happen in what Chris
Jones called the «black box» of the designer's mind (JONES,
1969). There is no point of application for scientific theory or
knowledge. It may of course be proposed that scientific
knowledge, once absorbed adds itself to the bubbling pot of
the designers subconscious as one more spice which serves to
produce the magically perfect design. In practice, we do not
observe this to happen. Nor should we expect it to. For even
accepting the Freudian theory of subconscious or uncon-
scious thought —for which there is no empirical evidence
whatever— still what is conceived in the unconscious must
come out. And it must come out through the gate of con-
sciousness, through the eye of the needle with its 7±2 limited
capacity. So the effective use of science in designing can only
be piecemeal, step by step; and it is just that piecemeal, step
by step approach which Romantic theories reject.
Designers are reluctant to give up these false theories. Few
designers are theoreticians, and, if truth be known, few are
much influenced by theory. This makes theoreticians very
cross. But if there is one theoretical point, on which a major-
ity of practising designers are agreed, it is in holding some
vague kind of romantic theory. Even Walter Gropius, whose
humanity, practicality, and immense influence have cast him
in the role of bogey-man for some recent writers, held funda-
mentally romantic views of design (GROPIUS, 1956; HERDEG,
1983). That is, despite the positivitism and pragmatism now
imputed to him, he believed that design was at bottom a mat-
ter of intuition and of inspiration. What this means is that
practising designers agree that there can be no explicit theory
of design, no formal description based on and conforming to
observation. Partly, this is because it is in fact very difficult to
give such descriptions. Designers in practice do not want to
be bothered by people with patently false notions of the way
in which design can and should proceed. Especially they do
not want to be bothered by such people attempting to tell them
their business. Romantic theories keep off the busybodies.
Romantic theories also sustain the Myth of the Romantic Art-
ist, so useful in keeping bureaucrats and engineers at bay
(HEATH, 1984a). Finally, Romantic theories help with the cen-
tipede problem. No practising designer designs according to
an explicit method. They do not want to think about it, lest,
like the centipede in the fable, who was asked how he man-
aged to control all those legs, they become paralysed. All of
this has sad consequences for the application of science in
architecture. It continues to be slower, more piecemeal and
more haphazard than it should. For this, however, scientists
and apologists of science are to some extent to blame.
Designers need these false theories of design in particular
to defend themselves against much more widely held false
theories of professional practice in general. Outstanding
amongst these is what Schon has called the model of Techni-
cal Rationality. According to this theory,
professional activity consists in instrumental problem
solving made rigorous by the application of scientific
theory and technique (SCHON, 1983 : 21).
Schon traces the origins of this model from the positivism
of Comte, through the German universities, to the universi-
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ties of America, and into the conventional wisdom of all uni-
versities and all professions. Indeed, as Schon points out, su-
perficial conformity to this model has become atcriierion for
professional status. Unfortunately this model is just wrong.
The growing criticism and self criticism of the professions
over the last two decades has focused on «the mismatch of
traditional patterns of practice and knowledge, to features of
the practice situation —complexity, uncertainty, instability,
uniqueness, and value conflict» (SCHON, 1983 : 18). These are
the realities with which the practising architect has to cope
every day. In design practice, few decisions, and very few of
the most important decisions, can be based on any well
founded scientific theory or technique. This fact is also more
apparent than it is in, let us say, medicine or engineering. Ar-
chitects have therefore had to explain why it is that they do
not do what they are «supposed» to do. They have had to ad-
vance an alternative model of their activity, in terms of which
it could «make sense» to others. Romantic theories have
served this purpose, even if they have not served it well.
In practice, design is not primarily instrumental. Instru-
mental problem solving implies that the goal is clearly de-
fined. The problem is of a known class, and a solution can be
reached by the application of established technique. Design is
not like that. Design is concerned with setting or agreeing on
goals as much as, or more than, with achieving them. Instru-
mental problem solving is approximated when there is a sin-
gle function or a small number of functions to be optimised.
The problem then lies in the means of achieving this. Even
then, we only have an approximation to instrumental problem
solving. There is always a limit to the number and scale of
side effects which will be acceptable. In fact, as has been ar-
gued in detail elsewhere (HEATH, 1984b) design can only ap-
proach instrumental problem solving as a result of some very
far-reaching social consensus on goals. In a fast-changing
world such consensus is scarce and becoming scarcer. Design
as instrumental problem solving is, we might say, an endan-
gered species. The designers primary task is, as often as not,
to secure some kind of agreement on what is wanted, or what
ought to be done. Nor does this apply only to the broad dispo-
sition of the design; it applies at every level from the selec-
tion of paint colours to (dare one say it) the choice of struc-
tural system. The limitations on design, the constraints within
which the designer has to work, are revealed as being much
more social than physical.
Design can, therefore, seldom be rigorous. At every step
the process is inflected by decisions about what ought to be
the case, by agreements and deals between conflicting parties,
by compromises with outside forces which cannot be control-
led, or cannot be controlled in time for the work to proceed.
The rationality of design is limited, as we have seen, by the
limitations of our ability to reason. It is also limited by the
rationality, or irrationality, of those designed for, and ulti-
mately of the social situation at large. Where a significant
portion of the decisions in a decision set or sequence are po-
litical and therefore, might have been otherwise, we cannot
speak of rigour. This observation was originally made in con-
nection with town planning (RITTELL and WEBBER, 1973: 155-
169) and was also soon extended in principle to architecture
(HEATH, 1972 : 91-96; SIMON, 1973 : 181-200). The implica-
tions have since been worked out in some detail (HEATH,
1984£>). The non-instrumental character of most design and
its lack of rigour are both consequences of its nature as a so-
cial activity. It follows as already argued, that design does not
and can never-under any conceivable circumstances, fit the
model of Technical Rationality. It is not a matter of our know-
ing too little; however much we may come to know, our
knowledge cannot fit into design in that sort of way. We
therefore need to give a new and better account of the way
that scientific theory and technique can and do fit into design.
We need this rather badly, if the real contribution which sci-
ence can make to design is not to be lost.
Science is an invaluable aid to design, but it cannot consti-
tute design. No theory about the world, and no set of observa-
tions designed to test any such theory, will in themselves pro-
duce a design. Design is concerned with producing something
new; that «something» therefore does not yet exist to be ob-
served or theorised about. Design is concerned with what
ought to be the case, and this, as Hume pointed out in the
eighteenth century, can never follow from what is the case. (If
something is not, or cannot be the case it is idle to say that it
ought to be, but that is a different matter). Existing solutions
to practical problems which incorporate scientific theory may
act as the starting point of a new design, but that is because
they have, themselves, been designed, not because of the sci-
entific theory which they incorporate. Theories of science as
an activity, for example the hypothesis-test-hypothesis exit
theory, may provide models for theories of design, but they
do not constitute design, any more than they constitute sci-
ence. You cannot have a theory of science before you have a
science to theorise about, and you cannot have a theory of
design before you have design to theorise about. >//
Yet we know that science is an invaluable aid. We really do
not want buildings which fall down, or deflect or crack un-
duly. We really do not want buildings which leak, or are noisy,
or are too hot or too cold. These problems cannot be passed
over to engineers or technicians to solve after the event if they
have not been solved in the preliminary design. Nor is quali-
tative understanding alone enough, as MAINSTONE (1975,
1983) has shown so entertainingly in connection with the
failures of Santa Sophia in Istanbul. What applies to struc-
tures applies to heat exchange, sound penetration, wind pres-
sure: designers do not only need to know how, but pretty ac-
curately how much. But where does this fit into the design
process? To answer that we need better models of design as
an activity than we have been accustomed to use.
Design can be pictured as a process of «imaging» or imag-
ining, representing, and testing, which is repeated until an
acceptable, or «satisficing» proposal is obtained. This model
is proposed by Zeisel in his book Inquiry by Design (ZEISEL,
1981); it is based on an extensive review of the literature and
is consistent, though not identical, with other current models,
for example, that given by HEATH (1984b, ch. 6.5). Zeisel de-
veloped this model to cope with the application problem in
environment-behaviour research, and it is therefore peculiarly
applicable to our present concern. «Imaging», Zeisel says
«means forming a general, sometimes only fuzzy, mental pic-
ture of a part of the world». Just how this is done will not be
discussed here; a detailed discussion can be found in HEATH
(1984è, ch. 2.5) though much more empirical work is needed.
In any case it is not very important, because this initial image,
limited as it is by the capacity of our short term memory, ex-
ists only to be amended, added to, and generally improved.
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This cannot happen in the short term memory alone. There-
fore, it has to be represented: placed in what Newell and
Simon have called the external memory (NEWELL and SIMON,
1972). Usually in the case of architectural design this presen-
tation will take the form of a drawing —at this stage, a rough
sketch. The presentation is then tested, that is, it is critically
examined to see how well it fits what is known about the
problem, whether its aesthetic implications are satisfactory or
not, and so on. It is then rejected, modified or developed. All
this can happen very rapidly; each line added to a sketch may
represent a complete cycle. Depending on where the start has
been made, a part of the problem may be expanded and added
to, or an overall structure individuated and elaborated; and the
two processes may alternate.
Zeisel pictures the development of this process as taking
place through linked cycles: what he calls «a spiral meta-
phor». If it is proceeding well, it homes in on a «zone of ac-
ceptable responses». This phrase draws attention to the fact
that in practice design cannot be optimised. This is true even
if we disregard those factors, previously discussed, which are
non-rational. Simon was the first to bring out the way in
which most engineering design makes use of maxima and
minima, boundary conditions, rather than optima (SIMON,
1969). He coined the term «satisficing» to describe designs
which are acceptable in that they are within the boundary
conditions specified. Given that for each sub-problem of a
design problem there is a number of satisficing solutions Np
then the total number of satisficing solutions for the whole
design is of course Npj x Np2 x Np3 and so on. It can then be
n* shown that the number of satisficing solutions in a given de-
sign problem is much more likely to be either infinite or zero
than one (HEATH, 19846). From the point of view of method,
then, the object of the design process is to locate the bounda-
ries of the zone of acceptable responses, or solution space,
and a proposal which lies within them. The heuristic de-
scribed in Zeisel's model is efficient because in it proposals
or images are used to locate constraints or boundary condi-
tions and are progressively adapted to the constraints as the
work progresses. The constraints or boundary conditions are
the «tests» which occur in each cycle.
What science can do is to provide some highly reliable
tests. It may also serve other purposes. As Zeisel observes:
information used in designing tends to be useful in two
ways: as a heuristic catalyst for imaging and as a body of
knowledge for testing (ZEISEL, 1981 : 6).
Despite this, it is difficult to think of cases in which scien-
tific informations in its pure form is sufficiently concrete to
act as a source of images. Only when it is embodied in tech-
nology, or more strictly in a «technology package» can scien-
tific theory or knowledge act directly as a starting point for
design. Be that as it may, the action of scientific theory and
knowledge in testing proposals is intuitively obvious, and of
great importance. Science gives us precise and reliable an-
swers to the general test question, «if I do this, what will go
wrong?» Such answers will be in such form as: «If you do
that, the floor will deflect so much that loose objects will roll
about» or «if you do that, 60% of people can be expected to
complain of being too hot on 12 days a year». Strictly, locat-
ing the boundaries or constraints requires a further step: some
sort of social consensus as to what is or is not acceptable.
There is for example a social consensus that deformations
sufficient to cause loose objects to roll about are quaint in
Elizabethan inns, but represent failure in a modern office.
This point is worth noting because it is often overlooked. We
tend to learn the socially acceptable boundaries along with the
methods of predicting performance. Thus the assumption
creeps in that the design is somehow predictable from the
facts. This is not so; theory and information can only tell us
definitely what cannot be the case; that is, provide tests.
Such tests, applied at the right times and in the right order,
help to ensure that things do not go too far wrong. It is impor-
tant to make them at the right time. Design in practice is al-
ways a race against time: the resource of time is limited. This
means that we must home in on the zone of acceptable re-
sponses as fast as possible. The way to do this is to apply tests
as soon as they can effectively be applied; the longer we de-
lay, the more work may be wasted. For the same reason we
must apply tests in the right order. The most general tests
should be applied first. General tests may be quite enough:
we look at the order of cost before we attempt a detailed cost
plan; we look at the approximate volume of building in rela-
tion to the site envelope before we prepare the sketch plan. Or
at least we do if we are cautious.
The question then is what is the most efficient sequence?
How can we design process? For this is what the question
amounts to. It has been shown (HEATH, 1984ft) that there is no
general solution. However, it is possible to develop heuristic
models. Design processed can be thought of as directed net-
works of decisions. They can be represented, after the event,
in the form of precedence diagrams. What we can do after the
event we can also, by taking thought, do before the event.
That is, we can ask ourselves, what information and what pre-
vious decisions will I need to make decision x without too
much risk of being wrong? Having determined that it depends
on decisions m, n, o, p and facts f, g, h, we then ask the same
question again of these prior decisions and so on. It is of
course a great help to start with a very broad, rough model of
the overall decision process. Invention of such models is one
of the main tasks of design theory, and some progress has
been made. Such models are no help with imaging, and very
little help with presenting. What they can do is to improve the
efficiency of testing. They also serve as tools for what SCHON
(1983) calls «frame analysis». They represent the underlying
conceptual framework which the designer is using, and this
gives the possibility of choosing other, and more relevant
frameworks. This however, goes far beyond the scope of the
present paper, which has had the more modest aim of show-
ing how and why science is important in not getting things
wrong.
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